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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas 
and information concerning the development and improvement of 
the professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
*********** 
"In Vietnam, we were never successful in creating public under-
standing of our policy or its execution, and public opposition 
simply forced the Government to abandon its program. Vietnam 
is the classic case where public opinion, public reaction, in 
due time forced a major reversal in Government performance, in 
Government action, for better or worse, depending on your out-
look. I suggest that improvement in the capability to communi-
cate is critically important to the Government and to the 
military if public understanding and public support for their 
policies and programs is to be achieved." 
Barry Zorthian, President, Time-Life Broadcast, Inc., in a 
speech at the Naval War College. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: The tragic losses of the Thresher and the Scorpion in the 1960's 
created a demand for a submarine rescue system on a global basis. The response to 
this demand has been treated in a Los Angeles Times article of 22 April 1973. 
FEATURE: U. S. TESTS SUB RESCUE SYSTEM BUT IT'S STILL A LONG WAY OFF 
Ten years after the first loss of a U. S. nuclear submarine, the Navy still lacks 
a modern, worldwide system for rescuing sailors trapped undersea. A new system is 
being tested, but it won't be ready for the fleet until mid-1974, about four years 
behind schedule. And it will not become global before 1978 at the earliest. Even 
then, because of cost, the rescue force will be much smaller and spread thinner 
than originally planned. This will make it harder to reach the scene of a remote 
submarine disaster in time to save the crew. 
Rear Adm. W. N. Dietzen Jr., the project boss, explained the delays by saying 
the original schedule was overly optimistic. "We kept stubbing our toe on tech-
nology," Dietzen said. "Cost forecasts also proved to be overly optimistic." The 
Navy's first fir~ estimate for a system built around six small rescue submarines 
came to $139 million in 1965. It vaulted to about $350 million within four years. 
The bigger-than-expected price, coupled with the Vietnam war's budget demands, led 
to a severe cutback in the scopte of the rescue system. "The Navy decided we 
couldn't afford that expensive a firehouse,1I said Capt. William N. Nicholson, who 
managed the project for about seven years before retiring. But even the present 
concept, limited to only two rescue subs, doesn't come cheap. It is priced 
currently at about $221 million. 
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It was the sinking of the nuclear-powered submarine Thresher off New England 
on April 10, 1963, that jolted the Navy into realizing that its sub rescue equip-
ment was seriously outdated. As it turned out, the Thresher and her crew of 129 
men sank in 8,400 feet of water, so far down that her hull was believed to have 
been crushed by enormous water pressure. "There was no possibility of survivors," 
a Navy panel said. However, when Navy officials surveyed their available rescue 
ships and equipment, they realized they would have been powerless to have saved the 
Thresher's crew even if the sub had bottomed above its "collapse depth" of about 
1,2'00 feet. Navy engineers said it would have been difficult to bring men back 
alive from below 300 feet. 
Two weeks after the Thresher was lost, the Navy assembled a special study group 
and handed it the urgent mission of recommending modern rescue methods and mechan-
isms. Nothing could be done to help men inside submarines sunk in the very deep 
oceans, like the Thresher and later, in 1968, the Scorpion, which went down in the 
mid-Atlantic. But the experts believed that subs were most likely to get into 
trouble when traveling in relatively shallow water off seacoasts and in approaches 
to ports. Here, they felt, lay the greatest danger of collision with surface ships 
and malfunctions during diving exercises and trials. 
The upshot of the study was a recommendation for construction of six small, 
specially designed rescue submarines, tough enough to survive nearly a mile deep. 
Obviously, the experts were preparing for the time when advanced combat subs would 
be able to cruise at such depths. The 50-foot rescue subs would be kept in r~adiness 
at three U. S. homeports on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and probably in Hawaii. 
When word of a submarine disaster was flashed from anywhere in the world, a rescue 
craft would be moved by truck to a nearby airfield. There, the little sub and its 
supporting gear would be loaded separately into three huge Air Force C-14l transport 
planes and flown to a port nearest the scene of the trouble. More than 50 foreign 
ports already have been earmerked for this purpose. Navy officials say they are 
confident the governments involved will cooperate. Meanwhile, a nuclear-powered 
attack submarine, modified to carry the rescue sub piggy-back, would head for the 
same port at high speed. At the rendezvous, the rescue sub would be attached to the 
mother submarine's deck and the two would travel toward the disabled craft. Once 
near the disabled submarine, the resuce sub would leave the mother craft and make its 
way to the vessel in trouble, mating with that submarine's rescue hatch. The rescue 
sub is designed to carry 24 survivors at a time back to the mother submarine. 
This scenario still holds in the planning, but the scaled-down resources makes 
the task more difficult. Instead of six rescue subs positioned at three home ports, 
there will be only two stationed at a single port, San Diego. These two rescue subs 
are now undergoing tests and will become operational about June, 1974. Instead of 
24 mother submarines, there will be only 15 to spread around the world. Right now, 
the Navy has only two modified subs for this purpose. The full 15 will not be avail-
able at least until 1978. As originally conceived, the six-rescue sub program with 
24 mother subs would have been able to bring off a rescue within 24 hours of a disaster. 
But with the force sharply reduced, the thinking now is in terms of a 50-hour rescue 
period. Dietzen claims the system, even in its limited form, will represent a 
worldwide rescue capability. Capt. Nicholson says that the "probability of success 
goes down rapidly after 24 hours." 
TOPIC: PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING ON THE FITNESS OF OFFICERS 
On 26 April 1973, the Superintendent met with representatives of the Student 
Council to discuss the current evolution of fitness reporting procedures at the 
Postgraduate School. The following is a summarization of Rear Admiral Freeman's 




An officer's fitness report covering a period of instruction has traditionally 
been undervalued by both the officer and the navy at large. But should attendance 
be considered "dead time" when the not uncommon tour of two years represents 10% 
of a twenty year career? Duty here is not unlike many large staff billets and 
many other shore assignments where there is infrequent contact with the reporting 
senior or the nature of the assignment is quite dissimilar to the one previous. 
Officers attending the Postgraduate School are not on a sabbatical year but are on 
the contrary performing their assigned duties! 
The Superintendent is convinced that a meaningful report is possible and has 
commissioned a staff study directed toward that end. It is necessary, however, 
to convince the rest of the navy that these reports are significant input for the 
deliberation of selection boards by instituting a valid and consistent fitness 
reporting process. 
,What, then, should be the criteria? Academic standing has traditionally been 
a major benchmark, but QPR alone is inadequate. To optimize personal contact and 
hence insure the observance of other traits, a preliminary guideline has been 
established limiting the responsibility of each evaluator to fifty officers. 
Additional input would be sought from other sources such as section leaders and 
instructors. 
Concern over the v~riations between the numerous curricula is understandable, 
but such variations are not totally unexpected. Similar inequities exist between 
departments or ships and are an accepted hazard in each naval career. However, 
the number of officers at this school nominated for accelerated promotion during the 
past year has been increasing and is officially interpreted as a sign of progress 
toward relevancy in the reporting process. The exact nature of the final system is 
to be defined at some point in the future, but positive results from this effort 
have already been observed. The outcome can only help the student by providing him 
with positive feedback on his performance and assist the navy by providing more 
relevant information to subsequent selection boards. 
EDITORIAL 
Recently printed letters to the editor have begun the exchange of ideas and 
opinions that the editors had hoped to stimulate. In addition, other feedback 
has been received on various subjects of newspaper policy. It is hoped that this 
interest will grow in order that the BAROMETER can discuss topics that meet its 
established purpose and be of interest to its readers. If you have an article you 
would like to contribute, an opinion that you would like to express to the editor, 
or a question about the paper's policy send them to the editors c/o the SMC's 
listed. 
